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Abstract 
The European Semester is an information-driven surveillance system that relies upon budgetary 
and economic statistics collected from the European Union’s (EU) member states and analyzed 
by the European Commission. This is true for both the Excessive Deficit Procedure and the 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure.  This paper employs Principal-Agent theory to analyze 
the politics of  asymmetric information and how this is addressed in the EDP and MIP.  This 
study explores how the statistical requirements of Six Pack have been enforced by the 
Commission and ECOFIN to strengthen the EDP, even as the statistical integrity of the MIP 
received less protection. The paper focuses on the case of the Spanish Valencia’s 
misrepresentation of statistics that provoked the first financial sanction in the history of 
Economic and Monetary Union, as well as efforts by the Commission to strengthen the reliability 
of MIP statistics. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The European Semester was created in response to the Greek and euro crises to strengthen and 
deepen the fiscal and economic coordination of the European Union.  At the center of the 
Semester is an information-driven surveillance process that relies heavily upon fiscal and 
economic information collected from the member states and analyzed by the European 
Commission (Commission).  This is true for both the Stability and Growth Pact’s (SGP) 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) and the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP).  The 
EDP relies on deficit and debt statistics to determine member state compliance and the 
application of sanctions.  The MIP relies on eleven headline and twenty-eight auxiliary statistical 
indicators as part of the EU's economic alert mechanism to determine whether to activate In-
Depth Reviews and the application of sanctions (Essi and Stiglbauer 2011; Moschella 2014).  As 
stated in the Six Pack, ‘The availability of fiscal data is crucial to the proper functioning of the 
budgetary surveillance framework of the Union,’ and ‘Reliable statistical data is the basis for the 
surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances’ (Council Directive 2011/85/EU; Council Regulation 
1174/2011).  Both procedures function in the context of asymmetrical information relationships 
where supranational organizations must obtain statistical information generated by the member 
states that may ultimately serve as the basis for corrective sanctioning through the EDP and the 
Excessive Imbalance Procedure (EIP).   
 
Despite the significance of the Semester’s asymmetric information for EU economic governance, 
with few exceptions, little scholarly attention has been paid as to how the rules governing the 
Semester’s procedures for administering these data affect the political relations between EU 
institutions and the member states (Savage 2005; Schelkle 2009; Mabbett and Schelkle 2014; 
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Gandrud and Hallerberg 2016).  This paper addresses this deficiency in the literature by 
analyzing through a Principal-Agent (PA) framework the politics of asymmetric information in 
the EDP and MIP.  As a result of the Greek and euro crises, member states agreed to long-
standing Commission initiatives  to change the information and date gathering requirements of 
the surveillance process from one characterized by a fire-alarm to a police patrol system of 
monitoring.  The layering of new rules and administrative practices  significantly expanded the 
scope of  economic EU surveillance in the form of the Semester (Chang 2013a; Verdun 2015).  
In the context of the Semester’s extensive information requirements, this paper first explores 
how the Commission and the Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) required 
member state compliance with the statistical provisions of the Semester to strengthen the EDP.  
For the first time in the history of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), a member state has 
been subjected to the ultimate sanction:  a financial penalty.  This fine was imposed not for a 
member state’s violation of the EDPs deficit and debt  thresholds, but for the failure to provide 
accurate statistical information to the Commission.  This paper next  examines a similar, but less 
successful initiative by the Commission to strengthen the accuracy of its MIP statistics.  Because 
of these decisions taken by both principals and agents, in the context of ensuring the credibility 
of member state statistics the EDP resembles an enhanced police patrol monitoring system while 
the MIP resembles the less rigorous fire alarm approach to surveillance.   
 
Finally, this paper places the politics of EDP/MIP asymmetric information within the context of 
the current debate over the rise of intergovernmentalism since the onset of the euro crisis.  As 
anticipated by PA theory, the creation and enforcement of the EU’s surveillance procedures 
reflect the ebb and flow of power relationships between multiple principals and supranational 
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agents that are dynamic and contested over time.  Most recently, the member states through the 
European Council have reasserted their authority over EU economic governance as a result of the 
euro crisis (Puetter 2012; Bickerton et al 2014; Hodson 2013; Schimmelfennig 2015).  The euro 
crisis has also witnessed the rise of the European Parliament (EP) as an additional principal in 
the surveillance process (Dinan 2014; Rittberger 2014).  This paper argues that this 
intergovernmentalist turn occurred even as ECOFIN approved the Commission’s entrepreneurial 
initiatives for enhanced authority over the member states in the effort to control asymmetric 
information (Ellinas and Suleiman 2011; Chang 2013b; Bauer and Becker 2014a, 2014b; 
Dehousse 2015; Savage and Verdun 2015).  Yet, at the same time, as will be shown here, the 
member states have withheld approval for the Commission’s proposed regulation over the 
quality of MIP statistics that they view as counter to their interests (Conceição-Heldt 2016; 
Bauer and Becker 2016). 
 
2. THE DYNAMICS OF PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY AND ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION 
This study employs a PA framework to analyze the surveillance relationships between and 
among member states and EU institutions, especially the Commission.  In PA theory, principals 
delegate authority and functional tasks to agents because of their organizational capacities and 
technical competencies.  PA relationships may be cooperative, but they are frequently contested 
and even adversarial.  Tensions exist because agents often have their own agendas and 
organizational imperatives that may result in opportunistic behavior that runs counter to the 
interests and intent of their principals.  This opportunistic behavior often takes the form of 
agency loss in the form of drift and shirking, where agents pursue their own preferences rather 
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than those of the principals.  Agents possess privileged asymmetric information that they may 
misrepresent or hide from principals to advice their interests (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; 
Miller 2004).  Principals respond to the presence of this asymmetric information asymmetry 
through monitoring and sanctioning.  Classic PA theory expresses a clear preference for the 
monitoring system that principals should employ to control their agents.  The strongest 
expression of this is found in the difference between ‘police patrol’ and ‘fire alarm’ monitoring .  
PA theorists reason that decentralized fire alarm systems result in fewer transactions costs for 
principals and are more politically effective than centralized police patrol systems.  Where police 
patrol systems require extensive,  burdensome, and costly direct oversight by principals of their 
agents, fire alarm systems rely upon constituents and vested interests to complain, or sound the 
alarm, about dysfunctional, unresponsive agents.  Although monitoring systems often include 
elements of the two methods of surveillance, PA theorists argue that ‘predominantly’ 
decentralized fire alarm systems result in fewer transaction costs for principals, are more 
politically effective than centralized police patrol systems, and are more ‘likely to secure 
compliance with legislative goals’ (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984).  
 
This paper argues that the classic PA model is inverted in the context of European economic 
governance.  Rather than principals monitoring agents, member state principals delegate to 
supranational agents the task of monitoring the budgetary and economic behavior of the 
principals themselves (Schuknecht 2004; Hodson 2009; Chang 2013a; Gren, Howarth, and 
Quaglia 2015).  The member states exercise final authority over their agents in the design and 
implementation of the surveillance procedure.  The member states ultimately determine how 
intrusively and in what manner the Commission may conduct its monitoring, and in this way 
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determine whether the surveillance system reflects a police patrol or fire alarm framework.  The 
principals approve the rules the Commission must enforce, and they ultimately determine 
whether they themselves should be sanctioned.  The Commission may, for example, propose 
how often and under what circumstance member states should be visited, and whether member 
state budgets should be audited.  Yet these initiatives must be approved by the member states.  
The principals identify which supranational agents participate in the surveillance procedure, and 
they adjudicate when multiple agents compete for the right to administer various monitoring 
tasks, in what constitutes supranational ‘bureaucratic politics’ (Pollack 1997; Schelkle 2005; 
Hawkins et al 2006).  To promote the integrity of the surveillance procedure, the member states 
may also delegate discretionary authority to its agents, granting them some of the prerogatives of 
a trustee (Majone 2001; Tallberg 2002).        
 
 The EU’s PA relationships are further complicated by the structure of some member state 
governments, especially those that are extensively federated or jurisdictionally segmented.  The 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and allied legislation apply to ‘general government,’ the 
aggregated levels of government within a member state, not simply the national government.  So, 
for example, in the case of Spain, there are 17 Autonomous Communities (AC), 50 provinces 
within those communities, and seven of those ACs are considered to be both an AC and a 
province.  Madrid is one of these single province communities while the AC of Valencia 
contains three provinces.  There are some 5,000 units of government and publicly funded 
agencies that report budgetary information that eventually constitute Spain’s aggregate deficit 
and debt figures.        
 
7 
 
Prior to the euro crisis, the member state principals  preferred a monitoring procedure analogous 
to the fire alarm system.  Through the TEU’s Article 104(2), its Protocol on the Excessive 
Deficit Procedure, and Council Regulation 3605/93, the member states delegated to 
supranational agencies the fiscal surveillance of the EMU.  Yet, member states limited the 
Commission’s authority to employ all of the monitoring tools available to conduct a penetrating 
surveillance of the member states’ fiscal actions.  First, for example, the TEU’s Article 126 
limited the Commission’s surveillance only ‘to identifying gross errors’ in the budgetary 
statistics submitted by the member states in their biannual reports to the Commission.  Second, 
the TEU did not call upon the European Court of Auditors, the one EU institution familiar with 
analyzing member state budgets, to deploy its auditors to review these budgets.  Third, Eurostat, 
the Commission’s statistical agency responsible for certifying the biannual reports was greatly 
restrained in making country visits and precluded from conducting audits of member state 
accounts.  To a great extent, the surveillance process relied up the fire alarms of external sources, 
including the media and private rating services such as Moody’s to identify egregious member 
state budgetary activity (Savage 2006).   
 
Furthermore, it is important to recall that sanctions play a critical role in PA theory.  Although 
the process of collecting information itself may produce disciplinary effects through the 
systematic use of surveillance techniques, the compliance of agents ultimately depends upon the 
application of meaningful sanctions.  In the history of EMU, prior to the Spanish case described 
in this study, no member state had previously been subjected to a financial penalty, despite 
widespread noncompliance  with the EU’s deficit and debt requirements.  Member states have 
instead been sanctioned by a host of soft sanctions that take the form of repeated reports, 
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recommendations, and guidelines drafted by the Commission calling for compliance.  The 
softness of these sanctions is exemplified by the Commission’s Broad Economic Policy 
Guidelines issued during the EMU convergence process. This fire-alarm styled arrangement 
changed in reaction to the economic crises that soon gripped Europe. 
 
3. THE SIX PACK: CONTROLLING INFORMATION EVASION AFTER THE GREEK 
AND EURO CRISES  
If PA theorists prefer fire-alarm systems, then why did EU’s principals move towards a police-
patrol system?  The Greek and euro crises served as critical junctures in the evolution of the 
surveillance process, as previously reluctant member states increasingly strengthened the EU’s 
supranational institutions’ centralized police patrol capabilities.  The Greek statistical crises of 
2004 and 2009, during which Greece submitted false statistics regarding the size of its budget 
deficit to gain entry into the EMU and that later contributed to the euro crisis, resulted in 
numerous rules that highlighted the importance of transparent and credible statistics (Savage and 
Verdun, 2015).  As a senior official in Employment Commissioner Marianne Thyssen’s Cabinet, 
to whom Eurostat now reports, noted, ‘Greece made countries very determined on making sure 
the data were correct, and gave Eurostat invasive powers it never would have got otherwise, and 
that was obvious.’1  After multiple requests, ECOFIN granted Eurostat auditing powers through 
Council Regulations 479/2009 and 679/2010.  Of the five regulations and one directive that 
constitute the Six Pack, one regulation and the directive focus on the problem of asymmetric 
information.  Council Regulation 1173/2011 outlines the policing of member states engaged in 
the ‘misrepresentation, whether intentional or due to serious negligence’ of government fiscal 
data.  The regulation establishes the basis for detecting, investigating, and financially sanctioning 
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duplicitous member state behavior.  The Commission is empowered to conduct surveys for 
‘detecting and exposing’ statistical manipulations, and for conducting ‘any investigations 
necessary’ if there are indications of statistical manipulation.  The regulation permits the 
Commission to interview anyone involved in the creation of data, if that person agrees to the 
meeting.  Significantly, the regulation authorizes the Commission to recommend that the 
egregious member state that ‘intentionally or by serious negligence misrepresents deficit and 
debt data’ be fined for this violation in a manner that ‘shall be effective, dissuasive and 
proportional to the nature, seriousness and duration of the misrepresentation.’  Although the total 
amount of the fine shall not exceeding .2 percent of the member state’s GDP, the reference 
amount for the penalty shall be equal to 5 percent of the misrepresentation of either the member 
state’s deficit or debt covered by the notification period of the EDP.  The Six Pack’s provisions 
soon came into play when the Commission sought sanctions against Spain for the 
misrepresentation of its EDP statistics.   
 
4. THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION IN THE EDP:  THE CASE OF 
VALENCIA 
The Valencia case is the first of two analyzed in this study that exemplify how the politics of 
asymmetric information play a critical role in EU economic governance.  In reaction to Greece 
and the euro crisis, the EU reinforced the Semester in a centralized police patrol-like manner, to 
the extent that both principals and agents agreed for the first time in EMU history to impose 
financial penalties against a member state for misrepresenting its data for the EDP’s surveillance 
procedure.   
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4.1. The Institutional Framework of Spanish EDP Reporting  
To appreciate the Valencia case, it is first necessary to understand that the EU’s challenge of 
managing asymmetrical information begins with the TEU’s requirement that member states 
report their fiscal and economic data to Eurostat on a biannual basis, in March and October. 
These data must be submitted in a manner consistent with the European System of National 
Accounts (ESA).  Eurostat exercises trustee-like authority to interpret the ESA, which  is the 
overall accounting system that harmonizes member state deficit and debt figures and determines 
their calculation for the EDP and the MIP.  The collection and analysis of these data reflect a 
long chain of interlaced institutional PA relationships within the EU, first emanating from 
member state approved treaties and secondary rules, through supranational agencies, to the 
member state national governments, to regional and local government and public units, all of 
which must be managed effectively to overcome the presence of asymmetric information in the 
Semester surveillance process.  The Spanish case suggests how this chain of PA relationships 
produces the budgetary and economic statistics that are employed in the European Semester.   
 
In the case of Spain, the provision of budgetary information to the EU begins with Spanish law 
(Ministerial Order ORDEN HAC/2283/2003) that requires the National Audit Office, which is a 
unit in the national Ministry of Finance (MOF), to collect budgetary data from the 17 ACs.  Each 
AC through its ministry of finance is responsible for producing a set of public  financial  
accounts.  Each regional ministry of finance contains a regional audit office charged with that 
task.  Spanish law delegates to the National Audit Office the power to audit central government 
and social security accounts, but restricts the auditing of regional accounts to these regional 
auditing offices.  In the AC of Valencia, this unit is the Valencia Audit Office, which gathers 
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data from the various government and publicly funded units in the region, such as the regional 
Ministry of Health.  There also exists both a National Court of Auditors and regional courts of 
auditors that are responsible for examining and ensuring the credibility of the data generated by 
the national and regional ministries of finance’ audit offices.  The Valencia Audit Office submits 
its data four times a year to the National Audit Office through the Standardized Questionnaire.  
The National Audit Office then translates these public accounts figures into the ESA national 
accounts framework.  These data are then submitted to the National Statistical Institute, which 
reviews and enters the data in the Commission’s biannual reporting forms, and then advances 
these forms to Eurostat.  Finally, EU Council Regulation 2011/85/EU, Spain’s General Public 
Accounting Plan, and that of Valencia require that these public accounts figures include 
expenditure data that reflect accrual accounting principles.  Expenditures are thus counted in the 
year they are formally recognized to be obligated on an annual basis in that year’s budgetary 
accounts.  Expenditures obligated but not formally recognized are included in extra-budgetary 
accounts, which are not recorded in the government’s annual budgetary expenditure reports and 
counted in its deficit calculation.  After these expenditures are formally recognized, they are then 
entered into the region’s regular public accounts.  Nevertheless, these formal rules and 
procedures were not sufficient to prevent severe irregularities from emerging in the Spanish 
statistics reported to Eurostat.    
 
4.2. ‘Severe Irregularities’ in Spanish Statistics 
In May 2012, Spain’s National Statistical Institute informed Eurostat that the 2011 deficit figure 
of 8.5 percent of GDP it submitted in Spain’s March 2012 biannual report needed to be increased 
by .4 percent. The Institute indicated that it had identified unreported budget expenditures in the 
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ACs of Madrid and Valencia.  Eurostat incorporated this revision in the October 2012 biannual 
report, which helped increase Spain’s 2011 deficit to 9.4 percent of GDP.  In June 2012, Eurostat 
initiated a series of on-site ‘methodological’ visits to investigate the cause of the revisions, as 
authorized by Regulations 479/2009 and 679/2010, and Commission Delegated Decision 
2012/678/EU.  Eurostat found that Madrid’s accounts were inaccurate, but accepted that these 
errors were unintentionally entered.  In the case of Valencia, however, Eurostat discovered 
extensive intentional misreporting and underreporting of health expenditures of €1.893 billion 
between 2007 and 2011. 
 
Eurostat’s investigation revealed a host of ‘severe irregularities’ that contributed to the 
breakdown in the PA monitoring system that Spain established to meet its EDP reporting 
requirements (European Commission 2015a).  The Valencia Audit Office failed to record health 
expenditures in their proper accounts, in a manner consistent with Spanish and regional accrual 
accounting principles.  The Audit Office ignored recommendations from the regional audit office 
and the regional ministry of health and failed to record expenditures in their proper accounts for 
five years, during which time none of these obligations were paid.  The Audit Office then 
submitted its falsified information to the National Statistics Institute, which reported inaccurate 
expenditure and deficit figures to Eurostat.  Oversight national and regional institutions were 
either ignored, uninformed, or powerless to control Valencia’s behavior.  Reflecting upon 
Spain’s broken surveillance process, an official in the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) declared that ‘when it comes to budgetary statistics, the national 
statistical institutes are in the position of gathering asymmetric information vis-à-vis the 
government.  So a government determined to cheat, could at least for a time, get away with it.’2 
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Valencia’s motivation for hiding its expenditures was rooted in the TEU’s requirement that a 
member state’s deficit and debt figures would be based on a general government calculation.   
This created adversarial PA relations over asymmetric information within the member states, as 
central governments necessarily began monitoring their subunits with greater attention.  In 2001, 
Spain enacted an internal stability pact, followed by the Organic Law of 2012 on Budgetary 
Stability and Financial Sustainability, and the addition of Article 135.1 to Spain’s constitution in 
2012 created in compliance with Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.  These laws 
progressively attempted to constrain AC spending through spending, deficit, and debt ceilings, 
enforced by sanctions, though analyses of these rules indicate that they have been ineffective in 
controlling AC deficits (Almendral 2013a, 2013b; Howarth and Rommerskirchen 2013). 
Valencia’s manipulations of statistics represented an attempt to evade these restrictions.    
 
The Spanish government discovered the Valencia Audit Office’s misreporting in 2012.  That 
year, the government created a Special Payment Mechanism (SPM) to assume the collected 
commercial payments in arrears to suppliers for of all of Spain’s ACs and municipal 
governments.  The ministries of finance of these governments were required to disclose their 
fiscal deficiencies by submitting invoices their unpaid bills to the central Ministry of Finance, in 
exchange for relieving them of these payments.  As the Valencia Audit Office was a unit in 
Valencia’s regional ministry of finance, the ministry was aware of these unpaid expenditures and 
included them in the AC’s invoices sent to the national MOF for funding through the SPM.  
Consequently, in order to benefit from the central government’s payment of its outstanding 
obligations, the AC of Valencia was required to reveal its long-term, unpaid expenditures.  As 
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the SPM process progressed and Valencia’s errors became known to the MOF, the MOF 
informed the National Statistical Institute that Spain’s budgetary figures that were incorporated 
into its EDP reports to Eurostat were inaccurate.  The Institute then notified Eurostat that the 
2011 deficit needed to be revised upwards. 
 
The discovery of these statistical discrepancies led the Commission in July 2014 to authorize 
Eurostat’s formal investigation of Spain’s deficits and debt figures.  The Six Pack Directive 
2011/85/EU outlined the new investigatory procedures the Commission could apply, including 
its right to interview ‘any person directly or indirectly involved in compiling deficit and debt 
data, who agrees to be interviewed,’ at any level of government.  According to the Commissioner 
then responsible for Eurostat and European statistics, Algirdas Ŝemeta, ‘The quality and 
credibility of European Statistics is not something the Commission is willing to compromise on.  
We depend on sound data to make sound decisions, and reliable statistics for evidence-based 
policy making’ (European Commission 2014).  Subsequently, a detailed report drafted by 
Eurostat and submitted by the Commission to ECOFIN declared that the Valencia Audit Office 
actively engaged in the misrepresentation of Valencia’s expenditures.                             
 
4.3. Spain’s Response and ECOFIN’s Financial Sanction of Valencia 
Spain defended itself against the Commission’s investigation and reports by filing an action on 
14 September, 2014 with the General Court of the European Court of Justice and by submitting 
its own rejoinder report to ECOFIN (Curia 2014; European Commission 2015b).  Spain argued 
that Eurostat never questioned the data the National Statistical Institute submitted for the March 
EDP, and that Spain and the Institute should receive credit for immediately alerting Eurostat to 
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the statistical discrepancies existing in the statistics.  The data reflected neither grave negligence 
nor intent on the part of the Spanish government.  More importantly, under the terms of Decision 
2012/678, Eurostat lacked the authority to review data prior to December 2011.  Eurostat’s 
‘covert’ investigation constituted an act of ‘retroactivity,’ by examining data dating to 1998, far 
beyond the period covered in the 2012 EDP reports.  This meant that the legitimate investigation 
was necessarily limited in scope and that penalties could only be imposed for the National 
Statistical Institute’s 2011 data.  Furthermore, member states often revised their data, so Spain 
should not be punished for what ‘is standard practice in the majority of countries.’  Finally, 
Spain’s notification to Eurostat came in sufficient time to avoid any compromise to the EDP 
process applied to Spain; there was no ‘detrimental effect at all,’ none that would affect the 
Commission’s surveillance ability ‘to identify gross errors,’ as called for the TEU.  Of the €1.893 
billion in missing expenditures identified by Eurostat covering the period 2007-2012, only  
€862 million could be attributed to 2011, the year in question, or just .08 percent of that year’s 
GDP.  
 
On 13 July, 2015, ECOFIN acted on the Commission’s reports and issued Council Decision 
2015/1289 that imposed a fine of €94.65 million on Spain for Valencia’s ‘serious negligence’ 
leading to the ‘manipulation of deficit data.’  The fine was set on a reference value that levied the 
amount equal to 5 percent of the effect on the deficit for the years of the misrepresented data, 
which totaled of €1.893 billion, up to .2 percent of Spain’s GDP in 2014.  ECOFIN then, on 
Eurostat’s recommendation, began ‘taking into account’ three extenuating circumstances that 
reduced the fine:  first, the additionally discovered expenditures did not materially alter Spain’s 
deficit for the EDP; second, the official deficit figure reported in the March biannual report was 
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promptly corrected in the October report; and third, the manipulation of statistics represented the 
act of a regional authority, not Spain’s national government.  For these reasons, ECOFIN 
reduced the fine to €18.93 million.   
 
4.4. The General Court’s Ruling and Spain’s Reaction 
On 3 September, 2015, the General Court ruled in favor of the Commission (InfoCuria 2015).  
The Court agreed with the Commission’s claim that by itself the investigatory process does not 
affect the ‘legal position’ of the member state, and that the Commission conducted the 
investigation in a manner consistent with Regulation 1173/2011.  Spain could only challenge 
ECOFIN’s decision and the fine, not the legality of the investigation.  Regarding the fine, the 
Court ruled that ECOFIN applied the penalty in a manner consistent with TEU Article 261, such 
that it could ‘annul, reduce or increase the fine so imposed.’  The Court rejected Spain’s 
assertion that the penalty should be set aside because this was ‘the first decision of the 
Commission to initiate an investigation on the manipulation of statistics by a Member State’ 
under the Six Pack, and that the investigation created harmful publicity that damaged its standing 
in international financial markets.  The Court dismissed Spain’s claim and ordered it to pay the 
fine set by ECOFIN. 
 
Finally, the Commission’s investigation, ECOFIN’s decision, and the Court’s ruling produced 
political controversy within Spain, and generated accusations between the central government 
and Valencia.  Amid charges of mismanagement and corruption, the People’s Party that 
governed Valencia suffered severe losses during the May 2015 elections.  On 11 September, 
2015, following the EU’s General Court’s ruling, the national Ministry of Finance ordered 
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Valencia to pay the fine that had been imposed on the central government within two months.  If 
it did not comply, the MOF would deduct those funds from the budgetary transfers normally sent 
to Valencia as part of Spain’s regional financing. 
 
5. MEMBER STATE PUSHBACK:  THE POLITICS OF ASYMMETRIC 
INFORMATION IN THE MACROECONOMIC IMBALANCE PROCEDURE 
The euro crisis and the Valencia case led to a reinforced EDP, but would  the member states also 
permit the Commission to administer a similarly intrusive police patrol-like surveillance system 
to ensure the integrity of information submitted for the MIP?  This section of the paper examines 
a Commission initiative to strengthen the statistical accuracy of  MIP data through new 
regulations that would clarify and enhance Eurostat’s authority over MIP statistics.  The 
Commission’s proposal to monitor asymmetric information, however, faced opposition from its 
member state principals in ECOFIN and the EP, as well as from and opposition from another 
surveillance agent, the European Central Bank.      
 
5.1. Eurostat’s Proposed Regulations for “Quality” MIP Statistics 
In 2011, ECOFIN declared that the MIP ‘must rely upon sound official statistics for inclusion in 
the scoreboard’ (Council of the European Union, 2011).  Following this declaration, 
Commissioner Algirdas Ŝemeta directed Eurostat to draft regulations that would grant the agency 
authority over MIP statistics similar to what it excised over EDP statistics.   Ŝemeta, whose 
portfolio also included Taxation, Customs, Audit and Anti-Fraud as well as European statistics, 
was well-known in the Commission for being a strong enforcer of EU rules and ensuring the 
transparency of financial transactions.  The resulting proposed regulation, COM(213)342, 
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assigned Eurostat the police patrol powers  to receive and assess the quality of the MIP data 
provided by the member states, conduct mission and investigatory methodological visits, express 
reservations on the quality of these data to the member state and ECOFIN’s Economic Policy 
Committee, provide the data used for the MIP, amend the data, and, acting through the 
Commission, recommend fines against a member state not exceeding .05 percent of its GDP for 
the intentional or seriously negligent manipulation of statistics.  Eurostat learned from its 
experience with Greece and other member states that without enhanced investigatory authority 
even country visits failed to reveal bad statistics.  Though this new regulation, Eurostat would 
effectively receive the same authority over MIP data that it exercised over EDP statistics.  As a 
senior Commission official with responsibility for Eurostat observed, ‘Eurostat believes if the 
data can lead to fines it must be of the utmost quality, and therefore it must be controlled by 
Eurostat.  If we put our stamp on it, we must have the power to check that it is good.  So now if 
you introduce the MIP that can also lead to fines, then that data should also be subject to the 
same level of control and invasiveness that’s in the EDP.’3   Ŝemeta successfully championed the 
proposal within the Commission, arguing that reliable and credible MIP statistics advanced the 
Commission’s administration of the Semester.  As an ECFIN official concluded, ‘It is difficult to 
take the position ‘I am against good statistics.’4   
 
Despite Commission approval, the proposal met opposition from another agent in the MIP 
surveillance procedure, the European Central Bank (ECB), which viewed the proposed 
regulations as infringing on its administrative autonomy.  Although the ECB plays no role in 
generating EDP statistics, it does produce  statistics for the MIP’s Net International Investment 
indicator and the Net External Debt auxiliary indicator (Hartlapp, Metz, and Rauh 2013).  There 
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are two major statistical data systems in Europe:  the European Statistical System (ESS), which 
Eurostat administers, and the European System of Central Banks (ESCB), which the ECB 
administers under the authority of Regulation 2533/98.  This regulation empowers the ECB to 
oversee the statistics generated by the various member state National Central Banks (NCB) and 
private financial institutions.  Thus, the working relationships are more frequent and the 
institutional loyalties stronger between Eurostat and the national statistical institutes on the one 
hand, and the ECB and the NCBs on the other.  The TEU and all subsequent statistics required 
for the EMU convergence process, the SGP, and the EDP rely upon the ESS.  The MIP also 
relies heavily on the ESS, but the Net International Investment headline indicator and the Net 
External Debt auxiliary indicator rely on ESCB data.   
 
After gaining approval from within the Commission, the regulation was submitted to the 
European Parliament and ECOFIN for their consideration in June 2013.  In its ‘Opinion’ to the 
EP, the ECB declared that the Commission’s proposal threatened the central bank’s 
independence in governing ESCB statistics (European Central Bank 2013).  The ECB argued 
that the proposal ‘seems to establish parallel quality assessments,’ while calling instead for 
preserving ‘the already existing quality assurance arrangements of the ESS and the ESCB,’ 
which ‘should also be applied to the statistical data for the MIP.’  Noting that the responsibility 
for generating MIP statistics are ‘shared,’ the ECB recommended that the coordination for the 
‘close cooperation’ between the two systems should take place in the Committee on Monetary, 
Financial, and Balance of Payments Statistics (CMFB).  The CMFB is the only institution where 
all of Europe’s statistical units, Eurostat, the national statistical institutes, NCBs, and the ECB 
come together.  Established in 1991, the CMFB is the premier body for setting policy on 
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statistical requirements and methodologies.  The ECB suggested that a memorandum of 
understanding (MOU) could be created in the CFMB to clarify the ‘practical operational 
arrangements’ between the two systems in the production of MIP statistics.   
 
The EP Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs’ amendments to the draft regulation 
echoed concerns expressed by both the member states and the ECB.  Adopted by the EP during 
the first reading of the legislation in March 2014, the amendments directed that the ‘the 
institutional separation of the [ESCB] and the independence of [NCBs] should be respected,’ 
added the ECB to the ESS Group of Directors of Macroeconomic Statistics, called for ‘close 
cooperation’ between the ESCB and the ESS, recommended that the ‘practical operational 
arrangements’ be set by an MOU, and required consultation between the national statistical 
institutes with the NCBs in the production of member state MIP data.  The amendments reflected 
member state interests by calling for the Commission’s ‘closer and more timely involvement’ of 
the national parliaments and the EP in MIP statistical surveillance, with NSIs potentially called 
to participate in EP committee hearings.  Eurostat would be required to provide the EP with 
provisional reports on investigatory missions, and final findings would be sent to the EP as well 
as ECOFIN.  Significantly, the process for fining member states was extended and made more 
difficult to impose.  The fine would consist of an interest-bearing deposit not exceeding .05 
percent of GDP in the preceding year, and it would be ‘a last resort,’ and, in an important 
revision, require that the offending member state be proved to be one that ‘has acted intentionally 
to misrepresent the MIP relevant data.’  When the EP considered the proposal said a Eurostat 
official, ‘they have it in their minds that the same sanctions [employed in the EDP] will be 
applied in the MIP.’5  Furthermore, this misbehavior must be one that ‘as a consequence has 
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impacted on the ability of the Commission to make a true and fair assessment’ (European 
Parliament 2014).  Thus, these amendments would greatly strengthen the EP’s role as a principal 
overseeing Eurostat’s monitoring of the member states’ asymmetric information.   
 
For its part, ECOFIN has ‘taken note’ of the regulation and it ‘welcomes close cooperation’ of 
the ESS and the ESCB, yet has not formally read the proposal (Council of the European Union 
2013).  Nevertheless, as Thyssen’s cabinet officer noted, the member states view the EDP and 
MIP data as serving different purposes.  ‘[The proposal] is mostly blocked at the level of the 
member states in the Council.  Their argument is that [unlike the EDP’s deficits and debt 
targets]…the MIP is more open.  You have the alert mechanism and the in-depth review; it’s not 
just that number that leads to the opening of a procedure that can lead to a fine.  Thus, there is no 
particular reason why these data should be subject to that level of invasiveness.’6  As a 
consequence, the member states support a surveillance system that offers less rigorous controls 
over their statistical information.     
 
5.2. Current Status of the Proposal 
The Commission is reluctant to press the legislation forward with either the EP or ECOFIN.  In 
lieu of the regulation, Eurostat responded by entering into an MOUs with the ECB in 2015, while 
creating a CMFB task force on statistical quality involving the member state NSIs and NCBs.  
These arrangements encourage cooperation in the development of MIP data, but they reified the 
ECB’s institutional roles in overseeing its separate data stream employed in the MIP.  
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
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These research findings  illustrate the challenges of managing the multilevel PA aspects of 
asymmetric fiscal, economic, and social information in the EU.  This study argues that prior to 
the Greek and euro crises the member states preferred a looser fiscal surveillance regime, akin to 
the PA notion of fire alarm.  Having some surveillance system in place suggested their credible 
commitment to controlling the negative spillover effects of noncompliant behavior, with 
relatively limited intrusion on member state budgetary autonomy.  The Greek crisis that stemmed 
from hidden information and its association with the debt crisis significantly altered the member 
states’ willingness to adopt Commission recommendations to create an enhanced police patrol 
type of surveillance procedure for the SGP and EDP, one that tackled the asymmetric 
information advantages favoring the member state principals.  Council regulations enacted  in 
2009 strengthening the Commission’s authority to visit member states and scrutinize member 
state fiscal statistics were soon significantly augmented by the Six Pack.  This legislation 
promotes deeper Europeanization and enhances the authority of the Commission  in confronting 
the member states (Knill 2001; Featherstone and Radaelli 2003).     
 
Thus, these crises strengthened the Commission’s role in economic governance, specifically as 
analyzed here in its role in managing and ensuring the transparency of critical asymmetric 
member state information  (Ellinas and Suleiman 2011; Chang 2013b; Bauer and Becker 2014a, 
2014b, 2016; Dehousse 2015; Savage and Verdun 2015).  The Six Pack granted the Commission 
the right to conduct investigations of member state administrative practices as they applied to 
fiscal statistics, the right to review the fiscal data and transactions of all levels of government 
within a member state, and the right to sanction member states with financial penalties.  As a DG 
Secretariat-General official observed, ‘If you look at it from a sovereignty perspective, we’re 
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interfering with what you could consider to be national governance.  Here comes a supranational 
authority and does not address the central state, which is the main interlocutor with the EU, but 
can interfere directly with regional authorities.’7  A DG ECFIN official involved with the case 
concurred, saying, ‘We have established a precedent…The extent of potential cases is huge.’8  In 
addition, in March 2015, ECOFIN amended Regulation 223/2009 to enhance the independence 
and professionalism of the member state NSIs, which worked closely with Eurostat in 
developing the European Statistical System that governs EU statistics.  This legislation promotes 
Europeanization, offers the Commission the opportunity to scrutinize the statistical activities of 
the member states, and helps build networks and epistemic communities among European 
statisticians.  In the Valencia case, it was Spain’s National Statistics Institute that alerted Eurostat 
to the discrepancies in that country’s statistics.  The ruling against Valencia advanced Eurostat’s 
authority with the member states regarding their statistics.  Because of Valencia, as a senior 
Eurostat official deeply involved in the case explained, “We now have the power to investigate 
and recommend fines.  Member states have realized they can be fined.  Now they comply.  After 
Valencia, everyone understood this can happen to them as well.  So they are much more 
cooperative in giving even confidential data to the statistical offices.’9   
 
Nevertheless, even as the Valencia case represents the assertiveness of supranational agencies, 
the politics of asymmetric information also reflect the assertion by the EU’s principals to exert 
their intergovernmental authority to restrict the Commission’s initiatives when they regard it in 
their interests to do so (Dinan 2014; Puetter 2012; Bickerton et al 2014; Hodson 2013; Rittberger 
2014; Schimmelfennig 2015).  The MIP presented the Commission with an important 
opportunity to expand its prerogatives through Eurostat’s oversight of the asymmetric 
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information it obtained from the member states.  A Eurostat official recalled, ‘We would like to 
allow for the possibility of methodological visits or sanctions…With this proposal, we have more 
elements to strengthen the process and make sure the data are credible.’10  The Parliament, 
however, revised Eurostat’s proposal by reducing its investigatory powers, limiting its ability to 
recommend financial penalties, and by requiring Eurostat to report to the Parliament.  In the 
bureaucratic competition between the two  agents, Eurostat and the ECB, the Parliament ruled in 
favor of the ECB, permitting it to maintain its separate control over statistical information.  
ECOFIN has yet to act formally on the proposal, but has signaled its lack of interest in 
strengthening Eurostat’s authority over member state statistics.  Thus, while the member states 
supported a stronger police patrol monitoring of asymmetric information for the EDP, they 
expressed their preference for a relatively less restrictive fire alarm monitoring of member state 
information for the MIP.   
 
In terms of economic governance, the politics of asymmetric information reflect the current 
status of the shifting power relationships between the member states and EU institutions as a 
result of the euro crisis.  ECOFIN approved the Commission’s entrepreneurial initiatives for 
greater authority over the member states in the effort to overcome asymmetric information 
barriers.  The member states conceded that obtaining credible fiscal and economic information 
serves as a necessary condition for an effective fiscal and economic EDP surveillance system.  
The member states and the Parliament’s experiences with the MIP differ from those of the EDP.  
The MIP has yet to be viewed as contributing to the type of economic and political crises that 
stemmed from the breakdown in Greek statistics (Zeitlin and Vanhercke 2014).  Consequently, 
the member states and Parliament have elected to rely upon an MIP surveillance process that 
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operates without the assurance of statistics as reliable as those in the EDP.  What remains to be 
seen is whether at some point the MIP’s alert mechanism and In-Depth Reviews may  be 
compromised by this decision on asymmetric information, leading the EU’s principals to 
delegate more authority to their agents in the Commission. 
  
RESEARCH NOTE 
In addition to analyzing the legislative treatment and administration of information, this study’s 
findings rely upon interviews conducted during the fall of 2015 with 16 senior Commission 
officials in the Secretariat-General, ECFIN, Eurostat, and the Cabinet of the Commissioner for 
Employment, Social Affairs, Skills and Labor Mobility.  Interviewees requested and were 
assured anonymity.  
1.  Interview with official in Commissioner Thyssen’s Cabinet, 16 October 2015. 
2.  Interview with DG ECFIN official, 15 October 2015. 
3.  Interview with official in Commissioner Thyssen’s Cabinet, 16 October 2015. 
4.  Interview with DG ECFIN official, 15 October 2015. 
5.  Interview with Eurostat official, 2 October 2015. 
6.  Interview with official in Commissioner Thyssen’s Cabinet, 16 October 2015. 
7.  Interview with DG Secretariat-General official, 23 September 2015. 
8.  Interview with DG ECFIN official, 15 October 2015. 
9.  Interview with Eurostat official, 7 September 2015. 
10.  Interview with Eurostat official, 7 September 2015. 
REFERENCES   
Almendral, V.R. (2013a) ‘Curbing the deficit in Spain and its autonomous communities:  A 
constitutional conundrum,’ Bij De Buren TvCR January: 68-77. 
 
Almendral, V.R. (2013b) ‘The Spanish legal framework for curbing the public debt and the 
deficit,’ European Constitutional Law Review 9: 189-204.  
 
Bauer, M. and Becker, S. (2014a) ‘The unexpected winner of the crisis: The European 
Commission’s role in policy execution,’ Journal of European Public Policy 12(2): 217-36. 
 
26 
 
Bauer M. and Becker, S. (2014b) ‘Debate: From the front line to the back stage—How the 
financial crisis has strengthened the European commission,’ Public Money & Management, 1-3 
May. 
 
Bauer M. and Becker, S. (2016) ‘Absolute gains are still gains: Why the European Commission 
is a winner of the crisis, and unexpectedly so. A rejoinder to Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt,’ 
Journal of European Integration 38(1): 101-106. 
 
Bickerton, C.J., Hodson, D. and Puetter, U.  (2014) ‘The new intergovernmentalism: European 
integration in the post-Maastricht era,’ Journal of Common Market Studies 53(4): 703–722. 
 
Chang, M. (2013a) ‘Constructing the Commission’s six-pack proposals: Political leadership 
thwarted?’ in M. Change and J. Monar (eds) The European Commission in the Post-Lisbon Era 
of Crises, Peter Lang Publishers, 147-169. 
 
Chang, M. (2013b) ‘Fiscal policy coordination and the community method,’ Journal of 
European Integration 35(3): 255-269. 
 
Conceição-Heldt, E. (2016) ‘Why the European Commission is not the “unexpected winner” of 
the Euro crisis: A comment on Bauer and Becker,’ Journal of European Integration 38(1): 95-
100. 
 
Council of the European Union.  (2011) ‘Council conclusions on an early warning scoreboard for 
the surveillance of macroeconomic imbalances,’ 8 November. 
 
Council of the European Union.  (2013) ‘Council conclusions on EU statistics,’ 15 November. 
 
Curia. (2014) ‘Action brought on 22 September 2014, Spain v. Commission,’ 22.9.24, Case T-
676/14. 
 
Dehousse, R. (2015) ‘The new supranationalism,’ Paper Prepared for ECPR General Conference, 
Montreal. 
 
Dinan, D. (2014) ‘Governance and institutions: The unrelenting rise of the European 
Parliament,’ Journal of Common Market Studies 52(Annual Review) 109-124. 
 
Ellinas, A. and Suleiman, E. (2011) ‘Supranationalism in a transitional bureaucracy: the case of 
the European Commission,’ Journal of Common Market Studies 45(5): 923-47. 
 
Essi, S. and Stiglbauer, A. (2011) ‘Prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances: the 
excessive imbalance procedure,’ Monetary Policy & the Economy Q4/11: 99-113. 
 
European Central Bank. (2013) ‘Opinion of the European Central Bank,’ 10.10.13, 
CON/2013/72). 
 
27 
 
European Commission.  (2014) ‘Commission opens investigation into statistical reporting in 
Valencia,’ 11.7.2014, IP/14/822. 
 
European Commission.  (2015a) ‘Report from the Commission,’ 7.5.2015, COM(2015)211 
Final. 
 
European Commission.  (2105b) ‘Annex to the Commission report,’ 7.5.2015, COM(2015)211 
Final.  
 
European Parliament.  (2014) ‘Amendments adopted by the European Parliament,’ 11.3.14. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+TA+P7-TA-2014-
0181+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN 
 
Featherstone, K. and Radaelli, C. (eds) (2004) The Politics of Europeanization, New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Gandrud, C. and Hallerberg, M.  (2016) ‘Statistical agencies and responses to financial crises: 
Eurostat, bad banks, and the esm,’ West European Politics Forthcoming. 
 
Gren, J., Howarth, D. and Quaglia, L.  (2015) ‘Supranational banking supervision in Europe: The 
construction of a credible watchdog,’ Journal of Common Market Studies, 53(1): 1-19. 
 
Hartlapp, M., Metz, J. and Rauh, C. (2013) ‘Linking agenda setting to coordination structures: 
bureaucratic politics inside the European Commission,’ Journal of European Integration 35(4): 
425-441. 
 
Hawkins, D., Lake, D., Nielson, D., and Tierney, M. (eds)   (2006) Delegation and Agency in 
International Organizations.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Hodson, D.  (2009) ‘Reforming EU economic governance: A view from (and on) the principal-
agent approach,’ Comparative European Politics 7(4): 455-475. 
 
Hodson, D. (2013) ‘The little engine that wouldn’t: Supranational entrepreneurship and the 
Barroso Commission,’ Journal of European Integration 35(3): 301-314. 
 
Hodson, D.  (2014) ‘Eurozone governance: Recovery, reticence and reform,’ Journal of Common 
Market Studies 52(Annual Review); 186-201. 
 
Howarth, D. and Rommerskirchen, C.  (2013) ‘Panacea for all times: the politics of the German 
stability culture,’ West European Politics 36(4): 750-770. 
 
InfoCuria.  (2015) ‘Order of the General Court,’ 3.9.15, Case T-676/14. 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=167541&pageIndex=0&doclan
g=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=625246 
 
28 
 
Kiewiet, R. and McCubbins, M.  (1991) The Logic of Delegation, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Knill, C. (2001) The Europeanization of National Administration: Patterns of Institutional 
Change and Persistence.  New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mabbett, D. and Schelkle, W.  (2014) ‘Searching under the lamp-post: The evolution of fiscal 
surveillance,’ London School of Economics European in Question Paper Series, No. 75.  
 
Majone, G.  (2001) ‘Two logics of delegation:  Agency and fiduciary relations in EU 
governance,’ European Union Politics 2(1): 103-122. 
 
McCubbins, M. and Schwartz, T.  (1984) ‘Congressional oversight overlooked: Police patrol 
versus fire alarms,’ American Journal of Political Science 2(1): 165-79. 
 
Miller, G.J. (2004) ‘The political evolution of principal-agent models,’ Annual Review of 
Political Science 8:203-225 
 
Moschella, M. (2014) ‘Monitoring macroeconomic imbalances: Is EU surveillance more 
effective than IMF surveillance?’ Journal of Common Market Studies 52(5): 1273-1289. 
 
Pollack, M. (1997) ‘Delegation, agency, and agenda setting in the European Community.’ 
International Organization 51(1): 99–134. 
 
Puetter, U.  (2012) ‘Europe’s deliberative intergovernmentalism: The role of the Council and 
European Council in EU economic governance,’ Journal of European Public Policy 19(2): 161-
178. 
 
Rittberger, B. (2014) ‘Integration without representation? The European Parliament and the 
reform of economic governance in the EU,’ Journal of Common Market Studies 52(6): 1174-
1183. 
 
Savage, J. (2005) Making the EMU: The Politics of Budgetary Surveillance and the Enforcement 
of Maastricht. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Savage, J. (2006) ‘Member state budgetary transparency in the economic and monetary union,’ 
in C. Hood and D. Heald (eds), Transparency: The Key to Better Governance? New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Savage, J. and Verdun, A. (2015) ‘Strengthening the European Commission’s budgetary and 
economic surveillance capacity since Greece and the Euro area crisis: A Study of Five 
Directorates-General,’ Journal of European Public Policy, 23(1): 101-118.   
 
Schelkle, W. (2005) ‘The political economy of fiscal policy co-coordination in emu: From 
disciplinarian device to insurance arrangement,’ Journal of Common Market Studies 43(2): 371-
391.  
29 
 
 
Schelkle, W. (2009) ‘The contentious creation of the regulatory state in fiscal surveillance.’ West 
European Politics 32(4): 829–46. 
 
Schimmelfennig, F. (2015) ‘Liberal intergovernmentalism and the Euro area crisis’ Journal of 
European Public Policy 22(2): 177-195. 
 
Schuknecht, L. (2004) ‘EU fiscal rules: Issues and lessons from political economy,’ European 
Central Bank Working Paper, No. 421. 
 
Tallberg, J.  (2002) ‘Delegation to supranational institutions: Why, how, and with what 
consequences?’ West European Politics 25(1): 23-46. 
 
Verdun, A.  (2015) ‘A historical institutionalist explanation of the EU’s responses to the Euro 
area financial crisis.’  Journal of European Public Policy 22(2): 219-237. 
 
Zeitlin, J. and Vanhercke, B.   (2014) ‘Socializing the European semester?:  Economic 
governance and social policy coordination in Europe 2020’ Swedish Institute for European 
Policy Studies, Report 7. 
 
